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d order parameters7 it is 
irrelevant which of the approximations 
correctness assertions. 
en using first order comprehension wit/i secon order parameters, however, 
of the ap~r~~~mation does matter; and e approximation yields a 
program verification system w has strictly different program verifyi 
than those systems we get using the other 
(l), (2), and (3) above are summarized l One of the statements 
given by Table 0 is the following: a partial correctness assertion p is provable by 
II that translation @I of p which is based on the first order 
is true in every weak second order model satisfying first order 
comprehension with second order parameters. (3) above is illustrated by the last 
row of Table 0 while (2) is illustrated by the middle row. 
Table 0 
Comprehension without parameters 
Comprehension with parameters 
in Sections 3 and 4. 
r is organized as follows: in Section 1 we 
ic. It is simple enough to allow 
points but it is rich enou h to derive the convention 
his resuits for conventional while programs. 
tation applies to these conventional p 
In Section 2 we present weak second order logic and state Leivant’s theorem. 
also introduce two l ns of partial correctness assertions in w 
second order logic ( 9 and show that they are all equivalent in 
standard interpretation. 
In Section 3 we present nonstandard-time an elational trace semantics in their 
rudimentary forms, together with two variants. also state theorems of Csirmaz 
and Sain, characterizing Floyd- oare Logic in these terms. 
Section 4 contains the proofs of our main results. des showing how one can 
obtain Leivant’s theorem both from Csirmaz’s and ‘s theorems, we also show 
equivalences between the other variations of weak second order and relational trace 
semantics. 
ection 5 we formally introduce the pro ram verifying systems and 
We quote the results f I. Sain [27, 29 which enable us to use the results 
qf Section 4 to obtain the weak second order characterizations of the systems 
tion 6, finally, we give our conclusions and directions for further researc 
now recall this definition. 
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ere f stands for x0 ) x1 9 . . . 9 xkml and 7 stands for xk, Q+~, . . . 9 JG+.~. 
( 1 ii e say that * is deterministic, if 
Throughout this paper k remains fixed. 
2. Let Th be a ‘I?-Qkeory and k E o. Let 4, #E Ft and let J?* be a lc-ary 
Hia% correctness assertion i -p.c.a.) is a formula of the form 4 + 
lJ*l& 
esaythat+[ *]J, is ~ro~Q~le in Floyd-Hoare logic from a (data) theory 
mbols Th kFH 4 -+ [Il*]#, iff there is a r-formula XC Ff such that 
and 
ere I-- denotes first order provability. 
tion of a program given in 
) is called a weak second order ~~~~~ of similarity 
a subset of the set of all finitary relations over the 
“), and E is the stan ard membershi 
er D and elements of S. 
use lower cast italic letters for denoting first order va 
capitals for denoting second order variables. Instead of x E 
X(x). I= denotes the satisfaction relation of weak second order logic (as well as 
that of first order logic). 
(i) Without loss of generality, we can assume that E is the true membership 
relation, for we can always identify with {a E D” : aEXj in the case that is a 
binary relation different from true m ship. 
) A weak second order model E) of similarity type T is a two-sorted 
model of similarity type T u {E}, where the universe of the first sort is and that 
of the second sort is S. The first order variables are variables of the first sort while 
the second order variables are those of the second sort. The detailed formalization 
of the many-sorted similarity type of ( S, E) goes as follows. e only data we 
have not specified yet is the nk of the relation symbol E. 
both X and Y are in S and is binary while Y is ternary t 
and E(XI, x2, x3, Y) are formulas. Usual many-sorted logic does not allow such 
his formula is conveniently false (i 
s is 
sati 
(i) Let F ie an arbitrary but fixed set of second o 
er variables and 
instances of the CO 
(ii) Following the terminology of Feferman 161,’ in t 
the set of those second er formulas of similarity 
order parameters i.e. second order free vari 
again, we denote the set of all 7-formulas, consid 
without second order quantifi 
enever the context is clear we write 
for (_?I”,)-[T]). CA-(II 
parameters and CA - (II 
parameters. 
ension without (second order) 
. Clearly CA - ( zO) I= CA-(I?:)- but not CA-(IZz)-F CA-(Hz). 
order formula 
Let II be a Th- 
3) of the input 
m. We define the weak second 
t relation of R to be the second 
(ii, ii)A 
wit 
In 
(2) n II@, 9) + I?( ti)]. 
order variable is R. 
osition to state our Theorem 1, the first pa ((ijc*(ii)) ofwhich 
cliff erent notation 
, in later sections, to 
efinition 2.4 we introduce the 
. p( il, u’) is defined to be the following second order formula: 
Notice that every model ( 
as some element of S; a mo 
YIN contains the least fixed point 
contain the least fixed point. 
2 (Weak secon order completeness of Floyd-Hoare Logic, revisited). 
(1) Let ++ [II*]+ be a Th-partial correctness assertion. Then the following are 
equivalent : 
ti) m kFH 4 + In*]& 
(ii) ThuCA-(l7~)7= Vii Vij[+(S) A 
(2) There is a Th-program lI such that 
ThuCA-(II:)t= ;‘N(E, u’)+@(a)] 
but not +FH 4 + [n*l+m 
. (1) is part of Theorem 6 below. (2) will follow from Theorems 
e next variation for 
e only reason t 
is introduced to illustrate t 
ie 
LA. kowsky, I. Sain 
e a variable ranging over 
ate 
e 
e 
e first two formulas express, respectiv 
in other words that C s a preorder on 
is that the state transi ion relation defined by II is increasing (or monotone) ~A1.l: 
respect o the preorder 6. 
(ii) Now we put 
In Claim 2.7 below we show so connections between the new 
tion. In Claim 2.7,4,# are arbitrary 
E) is a weak second order model with 
motes the formula 
only prove (i)+ (ii), (i)+ (iv) an (iv) + (i), ieavin 
for 
with 
def 
~WrllRl = 
Let R,=n{Rc Dk: hog, reachable from 
u’ by finitely many applications o 
and by the definition of R,-,. Then 
(i) + (iv) is similar to the above using Definitions 2.4-2.6. 
(iv) + (i): Assume (iv) and assume that there exists a finite execution 
of ll* in and terminating in u’ such that I= &(ti)= Let 
set of all k-tuples in occurring in this execution sequence and let 
reflexive transitive closure of II restricted to y Definition 2.6 and (iv) we now 
conclude th; t t= e(3). El 
nonstandard models. erefore it is ca 
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75% are now in a positing to state the main theorem of [S]: 
(Csirmaz’s eteness of Floyd- oare Logic). Let 
4 + [l?*]$ be a Th-partial correctnc-lss a3 93?ion. Then the following are equivalent: 
(1) ~t-m++wICI* 
(2) I-h l=N t#i +[n*]~~. 
. In the above approach t trace Q are not part of 
the model However, the function Q is used as a function symbol in the induction 
scheme (2) of Definition 3.1. In [28] an alternative version of nonstandard time 
semantics was discussed and proved equivalent o the above version. There, instead 
of the externai use of the time structure and the function e range of Q was 
to the structure and the time structure was coded inside this expansion 
Since we shall u this approach, and so variations of it, in some of our 
proofs, we define it more precisely. 
finition I.3 modified]). Let Th be a r-theory, 
k and RD c D”. au {R, c’} denotes the 
y c~,~~,...,c~_~ as new 
R D, ED). R D is called a 
iff conditions (i)-(iii) below are satisfied. 
dified]). Let Th be a T-theory, 17* a 
that 4 + [P]# follows from 
osition to state eore . . 
elational trace co 
elational traces 
and the range of Q(R) is made part of the ‘relational trace structure’. 
Remark (2) suggests that the llowing generalizations of the relation 
introduced which will be used in Section 4. 
Instead of the Relational Induction defined in efinition 3.3 we can loo 
stronger version, which makes the relation R explicit in the relational induction. 
ing be as in Definition 3.3. 
1 Induction): For every T L { ‘r c’)-formula y 
* I= (y(c’)hV17,jqR(f)A y(R)d7(~,,)+ y(v’)])+Vf(R(.ir’)+ y(R)). 
’ is called a0 
in trace which sati lational Induction. 
(iii) Let Th be a +theory, L! a Th-program and 4 + [lI*]# a Th-p.c.a. 
llows from 7% in nonstandard explicit relational sema tics, in symbols 
rb; iff for every model ofTh,everyPc Dk 
if RD is an explicit relational trace of PI* with input ED in 
RD, c’D) I= 4(c’) + W[R(R) n R(z, z)-, *(a)]. 
Definition 3.5 is the relational counterpart of frN introduced in the 
uce the relational counter 
(Soundness of the 
correctness assertion w 
trace with input ED in 
(Soundness of the ordered relational tra ethod). Let 4 + [II*] 
tness assertion which is true (in the sta sense) in ca a-s 
en there is a33 ~~~ns~o~ ) such that D is an ordered 
relational trace with j~~ut eD in 
*I== 
is left to the rea 
tics tics 
the exact con ion between nonstandard-time 
include a short proof of 
. . 
Proof of (2)+ (3): 
I= ThwCA-(I?:)-[71, 
with 
R[R(c’) h Progll[ 
(Z) A D(z, G) =+ 
Let a(R, c’) be Prog,, [R] A ;I( c, 6) we have 
I= Iii<& 6) l\VR[c(R, i?)-, R(6)]. 
want to show that not Th I=, # -+ [Il*]$. Let 
for contradiction, that this is 
nq c) I= Y(c’)A 
k 
l 
clef 
1 
= 

ion 
kit 
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rtial correctness assertion 
is paper we restrict 
e write 
The models tif 
unary function symbol 
that the interpretation 
cc-path from x to y}. 
e Ir-structure 
it is now easy and obvious, how to 
in Section 1, and define t 
be any formula of 
be the following 
ay be any formula of well t ) T l 
hueHi consist of the induction scheme 1 Pnueli and the axiom sche 
. Let Th be a first order T-theory, I7* be a Th-program and 4 + [l7*]+ 
(1) We say that m b fh#~tdl 4 + In*]@ iff m v lNDB~~ta~i + Kripke 4 + 
(2) we say that Th +Pnueli ++[n*l# 8 Thu AXP”Udi (=Kripke 4 + [n*bb* 
We now want to determine the exact relationship of the program verifying powers 
of the systems i in terms of weak second order logic and then 
compare them with Flo words, we want to prove a 
of Theorems 1 and 4, characterizing Floyd are logic, for the systems 
i. For this purpose we have to quote some results from [27, 291, which 
true for deterministic programs only. The first is a deterministic a e of 
orem 5 in Section 3. 
ationai trace completeness of 
4 We use here Fu re in the sense of always in the future. 
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ombinin is with yt . 
e following are 
(ii) The following art2 eqt.diuale;nt: 
(1) Th h%ueli 9+ 
(2) TlluCA-( 
e next resuit 
above systems. 
Table 2 
9 and LO are s 
we quote from [27] concerns t
CA-(l7:,)- 
CA-(ll0,) 
istic Th-program II* and 
*]@ but not Th kr 4 +- [lI*]$. 
ty type 7, a deterministic -program ll* and first order 
second order semantics by usi 
e r, a deterministic -program II* and 
IN -+ 
eorems 1, IO and 12 to ether imply the followin 
correctness a sertion provable 6y the metho 
but not provable by the 
( 1 ii tial correctness assertio but not 
rovab 
One can compare the program verifying powers of different program verification 
methods in several ways. They ah have in common that one singles out a class of 
program assertions X (partial, correctness, total correctness, safety or liveness 
properties) by their first order approximations. 
study was made in great detail for the class of part 
assertions. It is obvious how (and possi Iy tedious) to ca out such a study for 
other classes of program assertions. For a more formal treatment of safety and 
Ziveness properties, the reader should consult [4, 5, I6). 
In the approach of the ungarian School, as preszntec’ in Section 3, there are 
three degrees of freedom: i)ne can vary the time structure 57 3 elating it with a 
linear order and adding various axioms; ne can vary the in ion scheme, the 
comprehension scheme and one can also vary the first order approximation of t 
era 
though they reduce to only two: 
entify other classes of pr0g 
in we& second o 
The axioms chiefly used in [25] are versions of comprehension (just asdone herein). 
In this Appendix we show in detail how the choice of our Definitions 1.1 and 
oes not affect the otion of verifiability of the underlying programs, i.e. for 
equivalent flowchart programs, regular programs or while programs the same partial 
correctness assertions are ble in the systems presented in this 
consider first the case of art programs. In the literature (e.g. in [ 
is customary to associate with any flowchart program p a certain equivalent form 
)* which is a progra ition 1.1. For an arbitrary 
program p, y-formulas we define III kFH t# + [p] 
iflTht-~H(f)~ sf Definition 1.2. To justify this definition 
we have to sho llowing ciaim: 
and partial correctness assertion 
rogram the following are equ 
e original sense. 
true for the usual (cf. op. cit.) choice 
that this formula i, -xc, jj, yC as free vari 
disjunction of the formulas associated with the t 
Now n,(X!, XC, yr) is the conjunction of the 
case). For I‘$ s defined above the fohwin re e~uival~n t : 
(2) q!~ +[ p]# is Hoyd -Hoare provable from Th in the original sense. 
We only have to show (I) + (2), since the 
paper. Assume Th kFH 4 + [@,)*I#. efinition 1.2, there is a 
Ir-formula x(Z,3c,) with the properties listed 
construct he inductive assertion associated to the I s of p. The inductive assertion 
associated to label I is ~($1) obtained from x by substituting the term I for the 
free occurrences of X, in x. It is obvious, from Definition 1.2, that these inductive 
assertions form a Floyd- oare proof of 4 + [p]# in the origi 
Next we shall treat the case of regular programs and while programs. A detailed 
version of the above argument for the regular case is presented in [ 121. 
[ 12, Theorem 5.31 contains an easy and detailed proof of Theorem A for the case 
of regular programs. For completeness, we shall include ere an outline af the proof 
f(1)+(2) of Theorem for the regular case. 
In [17, Section 3.34 a function fl is defined which associates to each w 
ram p an equivalent flowchart fl(p). Let (PI tra cer of 
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this way we can assign partial corre 
grams are still the same inductive assertions taken from the Floyd-Hoare deri- 
vation. Cl 
In passing we note that for more general kinds of while programs the functton 
and the corresponding in great mathematical detail 
in [ 11, Theorem 4.9 and 
To conclude this Appendix, we observe that our eorem 1 in Section 2 does 
indeed imply the full result in [Is]. Assume Theo 1 (ii) for p, Th, tfi and # 
(extending the definition used in (ii) to in the natural way). Then (ii) holds for 
(pj as constructed above. By our eorem 1 then Th kFH Q + [(I&&*]$. From 
this the arguments above d readily a Floyd- oare proof of 4 + [ p] 
in the conventional sense. e other direction is easy. 
e authors are indebted to Frances, 6. Jaeger, S. Katz, A. Pnueli, J. Stavi, a 
Touitou for valuable discusstons. 
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